

## Message Text

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ACTION AF-08

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00 IO-13 CIAE-00 DODE-00

NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-04 H-01

INR-07 L-03 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

ACDA-07 TRSE-00 /090 W

-----092353Z 015609 /62

O 092250Z APR 77

FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2901

INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 3335

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFELLE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR CG EG MO MOPS AEMR

SUBJECT: SHABA INVASION: INTERVENTION OF MOROCCAN AND EGYPTIAN  
FORCES

REF: STATE 079023

1. I CAUGHT UP WITH FOREIGN MINISTER NGUZA THIS EVENING,  
APRIL 9, AFTER HE AND EVERYONE ELSE IN GOZ HAD SPENT THE  
DAY MARCHING IN SUPPORT OF MOBUTU. WITH REGARD TO THREE  
POINTS CONTAINED REFTEL, NGUZA HAD FOLLOWING REACTIONS:

2. LETTER TO OAU: ZAIRE HAS DONE ALL IT NEEDS TO DO RE  
OAU, AT LEAST FOR TIME BEING. GOZ HAD TAKEN EARLY STEPS TO  
APPRISE OAU PRESIDENT, SEC GEN AND CHAIRMAN OF COUNCIL OF  
MINISTERS OF SHABA INVASION AND THROUGH OAU HAD APPEALED  
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FOR MEMBERS' SUPPORT. OAU OFFICERS RESPONDED SYMPATHETI-  
CALLY AND TRANSMITTED GOZ'S APPEAL TO MEMBER STATES. AFRI-  
CANS HAVE RESPONDED IN THEIR OWN WAYS: SOME, LIKE MOROCCO  
AND UGANDA, HAVE SENT MATERIAL ASSISTANCE; MANY OTHERS  
HAVE LENT THEIR POLITICAL AND MORAL SUPPORT; STILL OTHERS  
HAVE RESERVED THEIR POSITIONS OR EXPRESSED OPPOSITION.  
MOROCCO MADE SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO OAU IN ANNOUNCING

DISPATCH OF TROOPS. GOZ HAS THUS OPERATED FULLY WITHIN OAU FRAMEWORK AND THERE IS NOW LITTLE MORE OAU CAN OR NEED DO.

3. LETTERS TO AFRICAN LEADERS: GOZ HAS ALREADY GONE ALL OUT TO INFORM AND ENLIST SUPPORT OF AFRICAN LEADERS, WITH CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS. BY DOING SO, GOZ HAS KEPT SHABA PROBLEM IN AFRICAN CONTEXT. AGAIN, MOST AFRICAN STATES HAVE IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER MADE THEIR POSITIONS KNOWN, AND THERE IS NO REASON GOZ SHOULD AGAIN SEEK THEIR UNDERSTANDING OR SUPPORT.

4. LETTER TO PRESIDENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL: GOZ INITIALLY INFORMED UN OF THE INVASION AND THEN PROCEEDED TO DEAL WITH MATTER IN AFRICAN CONTEXT. TO BRING IT TO SECURITY COUNCIL'S ATTENTION NOW WOULD BE A SERIOUS TACTICAL MISTAKE, FOR IT WOULD RISK INTERNATIONALIZING THE PROBLEM JUST WHEN ZAIRE WAS MOVING SUCCESSFULLY ALONG SOLID, DEFENSIBLE GROUNDS OF KEEPING ISSUE AN AFRICAN ONE. GOZ AS LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF SOVEREIGN STATE HAS PERFECT RIGHT UNDER UN AND OAU CHARTERS TO CALL FOR HELP FROM ANY OTHER STATES TO PROTECT ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. ZAIRE'S ADVERSARIES HAVE CLAIMED SHABA INVASION IS INTERNAL ZAIRIAN PROBLEM; THEY THEREFORE HAVE NO BASIS FOR COMPLAINING ABOUT ZAIRE'S FRIENDS FREELY RESPONDING TO A GOZ APPEAL FOR HELP. IF ZAIRE'S CRITICS WANT TO RAISE SHABA IN THE UN, LET THEM DO SO; ZAIRE WILL HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN DEFENDING ITS ACTIONS.

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5. NGUZA MADE THESE POINTS FORCEFULLY. HE ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT, WITH THE ARRIVAL OF MOROCCAN TROOPS, MOBUTU IS NOW DETERMINED TO STRENGTHEN HIS MILITARY POSITION IN SHABA AND THAT FURTHER MOVES ON THE POLITICAL FRONT SHOULD COME ONLY WHEN THIS HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. MOBUTU HIMSELF REFLECTED THIS LINE OF THINKING IN HIS STADIUM SPEECH TODAY (SEPTEL) WHEN HE LAID HEAVY STRESS ON MILITARY VICTORY AND IN EFFECT REJECTED A UN SOLUTION BECAUSE OF LIKELY SOVIET VETO AND DISCOUNTED OAU ACTION ON BASIS SOVIETS HAD ALREADY SPLIT ITS RANKS. AS FOR DANGER OF ESCALATION, MOBUTU OBVIOUSLY FEELS HE HAS CALLED THE BLUFF OF HIS ADVERSARIES, ALL OF WHOM HAVE LOUDLY PROCLAIMED THAT THE SHABA INVASION IS REALLY A ZAIRIAN INTERNAL PROBLEM AND THEREFORE HAVE NO JUST REASON FOR INTERVENING.

6. WHEN I ASKED ABOUT THE NIGERIAN INITIATIVE, NGUZA SAID HE HAD NOT BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE NIGERIANS SINCE THE MOROCCANS' ARRIVAL. HE WAS EMPHATIC, HOWEVER, IN SAYING THE

GOZ HAS EVERY INTENTION OF PURSUING THE MEDIATION TRACK TO THE EXTENT THE ANGOLANS THEMSELVES PLAY BALL. HE SAID HE FULLY RECOGNIZED THAT AT SOME POINT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ANGOLA; THAT EVEN AFTER THE INVADERS ARE REPELLED, THE PROBLEM WILL NOT BE RESOLVED AND TALKS WILL BE NECESSARY. BUT HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT ZAIRE MUST GET THE UPPER HAND MILITARILY, BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS COULD SUCCEED -- EVEN GARBA, HE SAID, HAD MADE THAT POINT.

7. NGUZA CONCLUDED BY EXPRESSING HIS APPRECIATION FOR OUR SUGGESTIONS AND INDICATING HE WOULD DISCUSS THEM FURTHER WITH MOBUTU. WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE THEY MAY HAVE SECOND THOUGHTS, FOR NOW IT SEEMS CLEAR THEY ARE BENT ON SWINGING THEIR NEW SWORDS BEFORE TAKING FURTHER STEPS TOWARD A POLITICAL FORUM.

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